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ABSTRACT
Metaethical contextualism is a form of moderate contextualism according to which the
truth-conditions of normative utterances are sensitive to some salient standard, norm, or theory
that is determined by the context of utterance. Metaethical contextualism implies that two
speakers might utter grammatically contradictory normative sentences without expressing
contradictory propositions, leaving the view vulnerable to the 'problem of lost disagreement'. The
problem of lost disagreement occurs when two parties to a dispute disagree, but their utterances
don't express exclusionary truth-conditional content: they might both be right. While metaethical
contextualists have proposed plausible solutions to the problem of lost disagreement, these
solutions are ultimately unsatisfying, at least in contexts where one would expect exclusionary
truth-conditional content. In this paper, I develop a form of metaethical contextualism that
predicts exclusionary truth-conditional content in some contexts of disagreement, thereby

assuaging any concerns that metaethical contextualism fails to adequately account for normative
disagreement.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Contextualism is a theory of language according to which certain expressions don't have fixed
semantic values, or meanings. Rather, their semantic values are 'context-sensitive' and depend
upon features of the context of utterance, such as who the speaker is and where she's at.
Contextualists and non-contextualists alike agree that some expressions are context-sensitive.
Everyone agrees, for example, that the semantic values of indexical expressions like 'I', 'here',
'now', and 'today' are context-sensitive. The truth-conditions of a Chicago resident's utterance at
midnight of the sentence 'It's cold here now' will be different than the truth-conditions of a
Miami resident's utterance of the same sentence at noon. What sets contextualists apart from
non-contextualists is that they think that expressions in addition to these are also contextsensitive. For example, contextualists about gradable adjectives think that expressions like 'rich',
'tall', and 'fast' are context-sensitive. Suppose that Maya has $200,000 in her bank account and
that Oskady utters the sentence 'Maya is rich'. Is Oskady's utterance true? As we will see,
contextualists about gradable adjectives argue that it depends on features of the context of
Oskady's utterance. Similarly, epistemic contextualists think that the expression 'knows' is
context-sensitive. According to epistemic contextualists, the truth-conditions of one's utterance at
a casual dinner party that 'I know I've eaten Ethiopian food before' are different than the truthconditions of one's utterance of that very same sentence in a philosophy seminar, where the
epistemic standards are higher. 1
Metaethical contextualists (or normative contextualists) believe that certain moral
expressions, such as 'wrong', 'good', 'should', 'must', and 'ought' are context-sensitive. 2 Moral
1

See, e.g. Keith DeRose (1992).
I use the terms 'normative' and 'moral' essentially interchangeably. However, the reader will
notice that I tend to use the term 'moral' to apply to questions about certain actions (like having abortions)
that I take to be paradigmatically moral in nature and tend to use the term 'normative' to apply to
2
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expressions, like 'wrong' and 'should' don't have fixed semantic values that are invariant across
contexts. Rather, the semantic values of moral expressions depend on the norms endorsed by the
speaker or by the speaker and her audience. According to metaethical contextualism, speakers
who endorse different norms will express different propositions when they utter the same moral
sentence. Assume, for example, that Jessica endorses some set of norms like Divine Command
Theory (DCT). On contextualist construals, her utterance that (1) will express a proposition like
(2).
1. Abortion is always wrong.
2. Abortion is always wrong according to DCT.
Similarly, her utterance that (3) will express a proposition like (4).
3. Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
4. Given DCT, Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
But we might imagine someone else who endorses some different set of norms that also forbids
abortion. In such a case, her utterance of (1) will express a different proposition, where 'DCT' is
replaced with the norms that she endorses.
Metaethical contextualism is a member of a family of views concerned to explain
normative and evaluative language broadly construed to include utterances about taste (e.g., 'tofu
is tasty') and (what is traditionally regarded as) non-moral societal norms of various kinds (e.g.,
'Sam shouldn't wear his navy-blue blazer with shorts'). So, for example, Josiah might utter (5),
expressing a proposition like (6).
5. Sophia should use her rightmost fork when eating her salad.

questions that are normative but not paradigmatically moral (like which fork to use when eating one's
salad). I recognize, of course, that this is a controversial distinction, but nothing of substance hinges on
this question for me.

3

6. Given the etiquette norms that prevail in the United States, Sophia should use her
rightmost fork when eating her salad.
Metaethical contextualists tend to treat the truth-conditions of (1) and (3) in the same way that
they treat (5).
1. Abortion is always wrong.
3. Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
5. Sophia should use her rightmost fork when eating her salad.
Jessica's utterances that (1) and that (3) are true just in case abortion is prohibited by DCT.
Similarly, Josiah's utterance that (5) is true just in case the etiquette norms that prevail in the
U.S. really do require the use of the rightmost fork when eating salads.
In general, then, contextualist accounts of normative language treat the truth-conditions
of normative utterances in what we might call a 'belief-independent' manner. That is, it does not
matter whether the speaker is a realist about the norms in question and believes that those norms
are actually objectively true or a non-realist about those norms but nevertheless thinks that they
are in some sense appropriate for the context. Belief-independent accounts of normative
language assume, then, that normative utterances always take 'weak interpretations', where the
truth of the salient norms are not included among the truth-conditions of those utterances. On a
weak interpretation of (1), that is, Jessica's utterance is true just in case DCT forbids abortion.
Or, to put it differently, Jessica's utterance that (1) determines a set of possible worlds, some of
which are godless worlds, in which DCT forbids abortion. 3 Belief-independent accounts of
normative language contrast with what we might call 'belief-dependent' accounts, according to

3

One common way of thinking about propositions is in terms of possible worlds. It is common to
say that a proposition is or determines a set of possible worlds. The sentence 'the cat is on the mat'
determines a set of possible worlds where the cat in question is on the mat in question. The set will not
include any worlds where the cat is on the couch.

4

which the speaker's beliefs about the salient norms of the context influence the truth-conditions
of her utterance.4 On a belief-dependent account, moreover, normative utterances sometimes take
'strong interpretations', where the objective truth of the salient norms of the context does figure
into the truth-conditions of those utterances. On a strong interpretation of (1), for example,
Jessica's utterance determines a set of possible worlds in which God exists, DCT is true, and
DCT forbids abortion. Her utterance is false, then, if God doesn't exist, DCT is false, or DCT
doesn't always forbid abortion.
The assumption that normative utterances always take weak interpretations leaves beliefindependent metaethical contextualists vulnerable to several problems. Among these problems,
the 'problem of lost disagreement' is especially problematic.5 The problem of lost disagreement
occurs when two parties to a dispute disagree, but their utterances don't express 'exclusionary
truth-conditional content'. That is, neither party must be wrong. Imagine that Jessica (the DCTadvocate) is engaged in a conversation about abortion with Sarah, a Utilitarian. Jessica's
utterance that (1) expresses the proposition (7), while Sarah's denial of (1) expresses the
proposition (8).
1. Abortion is always wrong.
7. Abortion is always wrong according to DCT.
8. Abortion is sometimes permissible according to Utilitarianism.
If normative utterances take weak interpretations, then Jessica's utterance that (1) is true just in
case DCT always forbids abortion. Similarly, Sarah's denial that (1) is true just in case

4

To the best of my knowledge, the account that I develop here is the first belief-dependent

account.
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See, for example, MacFarlane 2014: 8, Brogaard 2008:387, Dreier 2009: 81, and Kölbel
2002:39-40.
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Utilitarianism sometimes permits abortion. Jessica and Sarah seem to disagree, but their
utterances are not contradictory. They might both be right.
Metaethical contextualists have sought to recover this lost disagreement from several
plausible sources. Stephen Finlay (2017) suggests that these sources of 'found' disagreement can
be broadly categorized as either 'quasi-expressivist' or 'metalinguistic' in nature (191). Quasiexpressivists argue that the source of the disagreement between two disputants concerns
conflicting (typically non-cognitive) attitudes about the action or issue in question (191).
Accordingly, the above disagreement between Jessica and Sarah concerns their conflicting
attitudes about abortion. While these attitudes are not expressed as part of the truth-conditional
content of their utterances, they are nevertheless expressed or implicated pragmatically through
the use of non-truth-apt expressions like 'no', 'I disagree', and so forth.
Proponents of the view that normative disagreement is metalinguistic in nature,
conversely, argue that the source of the disagreement concerns which normative concepts,
norms, or standards are salient for the purposes of the conversation at hand (Finlay 191). For
example, David Plunkett & Tim Sundell (2013) advance a theory according to which normative
disagreement can be explained in terms of metalinguistic negotiation—". . . a largely tacit
negotiation over how best to use the relevant words" (3). For Plunkett & Sundell, then, the
source of the disagreement between Jessica and Sarah concerns which normative theory or
standard is appropriate for the context. For example, Plunkett & Sundell consider a case of
disagreement between Oscar and Callie, who are cooking chili for a party that they plan to
attend. After tasting the chili, Oscar says 'That chili is spicy' and Callie replies 'No, it's not spicy
at all'. Plunkett & Sundell explain their disagreement in terms of a negotiation over the
appropriate level of heat given the context (15).

6

These responses to the problem of disagreement are both plausible in contexts where
neither party to the disagreement is a realist about the norms in question. 6 Consider Josiah's
utterance that (5) once again.
5. Sophia should use her rightmost fork when eating her salad.
Imagine that Jamal, Josiah's friend, denies (5). Jamal hails from the country Vista, where it is
customary to use one's leftmost fork when eating one's salad. Unaware that different norms
prevail in the U.S., Jamal rejects (5) because he thinks that Sophia will make a fool of herself if
she uses her rightmost fork. It seems to me that an explanation of the disagreement between
Josiah and Jamal in terms of a metalinguistic negotiation over the appropriate set of norms is
plausible in cases such as these. Their disagreement is resolved through a discussion of the
etiquette norms that prevail in the United States.
There are other contexts, however, where metalinguistic and quasi-expressivist accounts
of disagreement appear to be incomplete. For example, I don't think that the disagreement
between two staunch moral realists like Jessica and Sarah is satisfactorily explained in terms of a
negotiation over which set of norms should be salient for the purposes of their conversation; it is
similarly implausible to suppose that their disagreement is best explained in terms of conflicting
non-cognitive attitudes about the action in question. In these contexts (henceforth 'realist
contexts'), it is more plausible to suppose that the disagreement concerns which set of norms is
correct, true, or consistent with moral reality. 7

6

A realist about some body of norms thinks that those norms are actually true, in some objective,
mind-independent and non-relativized sense. It's not just that they think that a certain set of norms might
be useful or appropriate for the context. Rather, they're true, or correct, and appropriate for all contexts of
a certain type. If Josiah is a realist about etiquette, for example, then he thinks that the etiquette norms
that prevail in the U.S. are the correct ones everywhere and better than all of the others.
7
To be clear, in advancing BDMC, I am not committed to the truth of moral realism. Rather, I'm
merely committed to the belief that many (perhaps most) people are moral realists who accept some moral
theory as objectively true.
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Advocates of metalinguistic and quasi-expressivist accounts of disagreement recognize,
of course, that disputants to a moral disagreement often hold incompatible moral views and that
this explains why they find themselves engaged in a dispute (Plunkett & Sundell 18). In failing to
fully take into account the speaker's beliefs about the salient norms of the context, however, they
assume that moral utterances always take weak interpretations, forcing them to explain all cases
of moral disagreement in terms of either metalinguistic negotiation or the conflicting noncognitive attitudes of the disputants rather than in terms of exclusionary truth-conditional
content. It seems to me, however, that one might plausibly adopt a belief-dependent contextualist
account of moral utterances that rejects the assumption that moral utterances always take weak
interpretations. In this paper, I do just that, sketching a form of metaethical contextualism—
Belief-Dependent Metaethical Contextualism (BDMC)—according to which normative
utterances take strong interpretations in realist contexts—where the parties to some normative
disagreement are realists about the norms in question. In these realist contexts, moreover, BDMC
predicts exclusionary truth-conditional content. Somebody must be wrong. In predicting
occasions of disagreement where someone must be wrong and other occasions (non-realist
contexts) where both parties might be right, BDMC can accommodate all of our intuitions about
disagreement, thereby avoiding the problem of disagreement altogether.
In §II, I provide a more detailed overview of contextualism, contrasting it with semantic
minimalism, and comparing moderate contextualism to radical contextualism. In §III, I provide
an overview of metaethical contextualism. I briefly outline several prominent belief-independent
contextualist theories, including Alex Silk's (2017), Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe's (2016), and
James Dreier's (1990). In §IV, I sketch the outlines of a belief-dependent account of metaethical
contextualism that purports to accommodate our intuitions about normative disagreement. In

8

order to show this, I distinguish, in §V, between four types of disagreement: (i) exegetical nonrealist, (ii) exegetical realist, (iii) non-exegetical non-realist, and (iv) non-exegetical realist.
Unlike belief-independent accounts, a belief-dependent account is able to provide satisfactory
explanations of the disagreement that obtains in each of these contexts. The upshot of all of this
is that BDMC enables additional traction on the problem of disagreement and allows metaethical
contextualism to satisfy the desideratum that a theory of normative language ought to predict
exclusionary truth-conditional content in at least some contexts. These arguments significantly
strengthen metaethical contextualism and assuage any concerns that the theory fails to
adequately account for normative disagreement. I consider an objection to belief-dependent
metaethical contextualism in §VI before drawing conclusions in §VII.

9

2

OVERVIEW OF CONTEXTUALISM

Contextualism is a theory of linguistic meaning that is best understood in contrast to a form of
truth-conditional semantics called 'semantic minimalism' (or 'minimalism' or 'literalism').
Minimalists limit the influence of context on the truth-conditions of sentences to 'saturation'—the
semantic-rule-driven assignment of semantic values to what Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore
(2005) call the 'basic set', or 'genuinely context-sensitive expressions'. (2). The expressions in the
basic set include indexicals and contextuals. Indexicals include personal pronouns,
demonstratives, adverbs such as 'here', 'now,' and 'today', and the adjectives 'actual' and 'present.'
(Cappelen & Lepore, 1-2). Contextuals include relational nouns like 'foreigner', 'enemy,' and
'national.' The truth-conditional content of a sentence is fully determined once the context of
utterance saturates these few expressions with values. For example, the sentence 'He is the
enemy' is context-sensitive because it contains the expressions 'He' and 'enemy'. One cannot
assign truth-conditions to such a sentence without information from the context of utterance that
saturates the expressions 'He' and 'enemy' with a semantic value. When Phil utters the sentence
and 'he' refers to Timmy, then the proposition expressed by Phil's utterance determines a set of
possible worlds in which Phil and Timmy are enemies.
These rule-driven 'bottom-up' semantic processes of saturation are best understood in
contrast to what Francois Recanati (2010) calls 'top-down' pragmatic processes of 'enrichment'
(to be further explained below) that are triggered not by a semantic rule but, rather, by the need
to understand what the speaker means and intends to communicate with her utterance (4). 8 The

8

It is helpful to think of 'bottom-up' processes as driven by the expressions of a sentence,
combined with the rules of syntax. Consider the sentence 'It's cold here now'. To determine the truthconditions of this sentence, we need a context where the indexicals 'here' and 'now' are saturated with
semantic value. We might think of the sentence like this: 'It's cold f(here) f(now)', where f(x) is a function
that is triggered in some context of use. 'Here' and 'now' don't have stable semantic values. Rather, they're
functions. This is how to think of a bottom-up process. It is driven by the individual expressions of a
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hallmark of minimalism, then, is its restriction of context-sensitive expressions to Cappelen &
Lepore's basic set as well as its rejection of the influence of these top-down pragmatic processes
on the truth-conditions of sentences.
Minimalism imposes a strict functional distinction, then, between semantics and
pragmatics.9 The result of this functional distinction is that the semantic content expressed by an
utterance ('what is said', the 'minimal proposition', or 'explicature') frequently differs from what
the speaker means and intends to communicate with that utterance ('speech act content' or 'what
is meant'). Now, according to minimalists, the truth-conditions of an utterance are typically
identified with what is said, not what is meant. This means that the minimalist is committed to
the thesis that the literal truth-conditions of a speaker's utterance might be different—indeed,
sometimes radically different—from what the speaker and her audience would regard as the
truth-conditions of her utterance. Indeed, the contrast between what is said and what is meant is
sometimes so great that the speaker is not only entirely unaware of what she is alleged by the
minimalist to have said but would ". . . strongly deny having said what the minimalist claims was
actually said" (Recanati 2004 11).
Among the primary reasons for this discrepancy is that minimalists are committed to the
idea that the semantic values of non-indexical sentential expressions are determined by their
conventional meaning. This straightforward approach allows truth-conditional semanticists to
assign truth-conditions to all of the well-formed sentences of a language. However, while this

sentence and the rules of syntax. In contrast, 'top-down' processes are not driven by the individual
expressions of a sentence but by a need to understand what the speaker means. Top-down processes might
be necessary even after all of the bottom-up processes are complete. That is, there might still be a gap in
the actual meaning of an utterance even after the bottom-up processes are complete.
9
Semantics is the study of formal linguistic meaning with a focus on the ways in which lexical,
syntactic, and compositional rules combine to determine the meaning or truth-conditions of a sentence.
Linguistic pragmatics, on the other hand, is the study of the ways in which speakers use language to
convey meaning in conversation.
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approach might be successful for some expressions (e.g., 'dog', 'to walk', 'television', 'bicycle',
'married', etc.), it is often unclear what the conventional meaning of other expressions might be
(e.g., 'tall', 'wrong', 'rich', 'everyone', 'enough'). As we shall see, contextualists argue that
sentences containing such expressions are 'semantically underdetermined': their semantic
content—which is said by the minimalist to be expressed across all contexts of use—is
incomplete. Hence, it is often unclear what the truth-conditions of sentences containing such
expressions might be outside of a context of use.
These observations lead many philosophers to adopt some variety of contextualism.
There are several forms of contextualism. Some, like moderate contextualism, remain committed
to the overall minimalist agenda, where rule-driven saturation is the only pragmatic process
needed to determine the truth-conditions of sentences. Others, like radical contextualism, extend
the role of context, or pragmatics, to include top-down pragmatic processes like enrichment,
where the meaning and truth-conditions of an utterance are influenced by the necessity of
making sense of that utterance. What binds the various contextualist theories together is their
rejection of the minimalist's thesis that context-sensitivity is limited to expressions in the basic
set. At a minimum, contextualists believe that expressions beyond those in the basic set are
context-sensitive. These expressions depend on contextual information to become fully
propositional—or to have truth-conditions and be truth-evaluable. Such expressions vary in
truth-conditional content from context to context.
2.1

Moderate Contextualism

Moderate contextualism (or indexical contextualism) is the most conservative form of
contextualism. Indeed, moderate contextualism bears more similarity to minimalism than to
radical contextualism. According to moderate contextualism, minimalism is false, but only
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because the basic set is too limiting. Moderate contextualists expand the semantic expressions
that require bottom-up contextual saturation to include additional overt indexicals not included in
the basic set—what Cappelen & Lepore call 'surprise indexical expressions', such as 'knows' and
'wrong'—as well as covert, or hidden indexicals (Cappelen & Lepore 8). 10 A hidden indexical is
an unarticulated expression that is allegedly bound to certain expressions, such as comparative
adjectives ('tall', 'short' 'fast'), and domain quantifiers ('everyone', 'anybody'). Consider the
sentence 'John is tall'. According to moderate contextualists about comparative adjectives, a
hidden indexical is bound to the word 'tall' that is saturated with semantic value by a comparison
class established by the context of utterance. So, for example, if John is a toddler, the hidden
indexical is saturated with the comparison class 'toddler' and the resulting proposition will be
something like (9).11 If John is instead an NBA basketball player, the proposition expressed by
the utterance that 'John is tall' will be something like (10).
9. John is tall for a toddler.
10. John is tall for an NBA basketball player.
Once these hidden indexicals are saturated, the sentence determines a complete set of truthconditions.
Similarly, Zoltan Szabo (2006) thinks that domain quantifiers such as 'everyone' in the
sentence 'Everyone passed the exam' are context-sensitive (Szabo 32). Szabo argues that
'Everyone passed the exam' expresses different propositions, and has different truth-conditions,
across contexts of use. Szabo presents a 'context-shifting argument' in support of his view,

10

Importantly, though, one might be a moderate contextualist about one domain but not another.
One might think, for example, that gradable adjectives are context-sensitive but that epistemic
expressions are not, and vice versa.
11
So, the sentence 'John is tall' is really 'John is tall(fx)', where x takes a comparison class and
f(x) yields 'for an x', resulting in the proposition 'John is tall for a toddler'.
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considering two classes where this sentence is uttered: Ms. Maple's and Mr. Oak's. Everyone
passed the exam in Ms. Maple's class but only half of the students passed the exam in Mr. Oak's
class. The intuition, of course, is that Ms. Maple speaks truly when she utters the sentence
'Everyone passed the exam' even though some people failed the exam, i.e, those in Mr. Oak's
class.
Though not herself a contextualist, Angelika Kratzer's work on modal expressions has
nevertheless significantly influenced recent work on moderate contextualism, including, but not
limited to, metaethical contextualism.12 According to Kratzer, sentences that contain modal
expressions contain hidden but implicit argument places that can be made explicit by assigning
an adverbial phrase such as 'in view of' or 'given that' to the missing argument place (2012 6-7).
For example, on Kratzer's theory, the deontic modal (11) expresses a proposition like (12) and
the epistemic modal (13) expresses the proposition (14).
11. All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors.
12. In view of what their tribal duties are, all Maori children must learn the names of their
ancestors.
13. The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
14. In view of what is known, the ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.
Kratzer (5-6).
Kratzer treats deontic modals that are paradigmatically moral in nature in a similar way that she
treats deontic modals like (11) that may be seen as less paradigmatically moral. On Kratzer's
view, for example, (3) expresses a proposition like (15).

12

A modal is an expression such as 'must', 'should', 'ought', or 'may'. See Finlay (2016), Silk
(2017), and Bronfman and Dowell (2016) for examples of how Kratzer's work is brought to bear on
metaethical contextualism.
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3. Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
15. Given the moral laws, Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
According to Kratzer's theory, deontic modals determine a set of ideal possible worlds. For
example, (3) determines a set of ideal possible worlds in which Felicia obeys the moral laws. (3)
is true if Felicia does not have an abortion in any of those worlds.
2.2

Radical Contextualism

Unlike moderate contextualists, who propose a relatively modest expansion to the list of
paradigmatic context-sensitive expressions, radical contextualists argue that most expressions are
context-sensitive and no sentence expresses a full proposition without the instantiation of certain
top-down pragmatic processes. (Recanati 2004 90). Recanati distinguishes between two
pragmatic processes: primary and secondary (23). Primary pragmatic processes are the bottomup processes discussed above, where certain expressions are saturated with semantic value due to
their interaction with the context and triggered by the rules of syntax. Secondary pragmatic
processes are top down and driven out of a concern that 'what one says' is 'what one meant' to say
(23). Consider, for example, the secondary pragmatic process that Recanati calls enrichment,
which is a pragmatic process that results from a need to minimize the distance between the
alleged literal truth-conditions expressed by some utterance and the intuitive truth-conditions of
that utterance. So, for example, Recanati considers the sentence 'Mary took out her key and
opened the door' (23). The alleged literal truth-conditions of this sentence are compatible with
Mary taking out her key but then just holding them in one hand while she opens the unlocked
door with the other. Enrichment works to bridge the gap between the intuitive truth-conditions
and the alleged literal truth-conditions so that the sentence is true just in case she took out the
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key and then used the key to unlock the door. Notice, though, that there is nothing in the syntax
of that sentence that would trigger this pragmatic process. The sentence is perfectly well-formed
and none of the expressions on their own give any hint that the 'literal' truth-conditions might
depart from the actual truth-conditions. According to radical contextualists, enrichment is
required in order to ensure that the literal truth-conditions are the actual truth-conditions, which
will normally require that one use the key to unlock the door.
Radical contextualism maintains that what is said is not separable from what is meant.
Indeed, as Recanati puts it, radical contextualism posits that ". . . the contrast between what the
speaker means and what she literally says is illusory, and the notion of 'what the sentence says'
incoherent. What is said (the truth-conditional content of the utterance) is nothing but an aspect
of speaker's meaning" (2004 4). According to radical contextualism, what is said—the actual
truth-conditions of an utterance—is not completely determined by the semantic rules and the
conventional meaning of expressions. Rather, the truth-conditions of an utterance are discovered
by considering the 'intuitive truth-conditions'—what the participants of the conversation would
regard as the truth-conditions of the utterance (90). According to radical contextualism,
moreover, the intuitive truth-conditions are frequently quite different from the truth-conditions
that would follow from a minimalist interpretation.
Unlike the 'minimalist criterion' posited by the minimalist, according to which the truthconditions of utterances are determined by semantic rules plus rule-driven saturation, radical
contextualists posit what Recanati calls the 'availability criterion'. According to this criterion, ". .
. what is said by uttering a sentence depends upon, and can hardly be severed from, the speaker's
publicly recognizable intentions [and] . . . must be analyzed in conformity to the intuitions shared
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by those who fully understand the utterance — typically the speaker and the hearer, in a normal
conversational setting" (2004 14).
Despite their apparent differences, advocates of minimalism, moderate contextualism,
and radical contextualism have more in common than what one might initially think. Moreover,
'radical' contextualists aren't, in the end, radical at all. Indeed, Cappelen & Lepore posit that
moderate contextualists are merely "unimaginative radical contextualists" (40). At issue, at the
end of the day, is the role of the 'minimal proposition' that results from the bottom-up saturation
of a sentence with semantic value. Even in those cases where the minimal proposition clearly
departs from what a speaker might mean by uttering it, minimalists think that the minimal
proposition is nevertheless useful. As Emma Borg (2010) notes, "it is simply a mistake to require
semantic theory to be answerable to intuitions about speech act content, for semantic content is
one kind of thing (a repeatable, codifiable, rule-governed kind of thing) while speech act content
is another kind of thing altogether (a potentially unrepeatable, nebulous, context-governed kind
of thing" (56). Minimalists are concerned, then, to save semantic theory from the burden of
answering to our intuitions about pragmatic theory. This is, of course, a sensible point. At the
same time, what, the metaethical contextualist would like to know, does semantic theory tell us
about the semantic value of 'wrong'?
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3

BELIEF-INDEPENDENT METAETHICAL CONTEXTUALISM

Metaethical contextualists are (typically) moderate contextualists who think that normative
expressions behave like gradable adjectives and domain quantifiers. Sentences containing
gradable adjectives are semantically incomplete and require a comparison class established by
the context at the time of utterance in order to express a complete proposition. Similarly,
sentences containing normative expressions are semantically incomplete and require the
establishment of some standard, principle, theory or norm in order to express a complete
proposition. Just as the context of utterance determines a comparison class that determines the
truth-conditions of sentences containing gradable adjectives, the context of utterances establishes
a normative theory, principle, or set of principles that determines the truth-conditions of
sentences containing normative expressions.
All metaethical contextualists accept that normative sentences are context-sensitive. In
order to ascribe truth-conditions to normative sentences, one must know which normative theory,
standard, norm, or principle is salient in the context in which the sentence is uttered. But
metaethical contextualists offer competing contextualist accounts. For example, Alex Silk (2017)
advances a form of metaethical contextualism that he calls Discourse Contextualism, according
to which the context in which normative discourse takes place contains a discourse-level variable
that accepts as a value a body of norms of some kind and which is supplied by the participants of
the conversation. For example, Silk imagines a conversation between Alex and Bert, where Alice
says (g).
g. Sally must give 10% of her income to the poor.
Silk says the following about Alice's utterance:
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The appropriateness of Alice's linguistic act of uttering [g] requires that the discourselevel moral norms imply [g]. Since it's mutually presupposed that Alice is obeying the
conversational maxims, . . . in uttering [g], Alice implicitly proposes that it become taken
for granted that such norms be endorsed in the conversation . . . So, since it's common
knowledge that Alice can expect Bert to undergo an abductive reasoning process
[according to which Alice proposes the endorsement of a set of norms that require that
[g]], it's also common knowledge that he will object if he has different moral views,
given their common goal of settling on what moral norms to accept. So if Bert doesn't
object, this will confirm that the context is as the appropriateness of Alice's act requires,
and the discourse-level moral norms parameter can be set to a value that implies [g]
(222).
Silk offers a weak interpretation of the truth-conditions of normative utterances (232). Alice's
utterance is true as long as the norms that she endorses require Sally to give 10% of her income
to the poor. Assume for a moment that Alice is a Utilitarian. Her utterance that (g) is true as long
as Utilitarianism requires that Sally give 10% of her income to the poor. Disagreement, for Silk,
concerns which norms are "operative in the context" (221-222). If Bert accepts different moral
norms, he will disagree with Alice, thereby rejecting Alice's suggestion that the discourse-level
variable should be set to 'Utilitarianism'. For Silk, however, since the truth of the norms in
question does not figure as part of the truth-conditions of their respective utterances, the source
of the disagreement between Alice and Bert is not which set of norms is true but, rather, which
moral norms are operative in the context (222). Silk's account of the disagreement between Alice
and Bert, then, is both metalinguistic and quasi-expressivist. Alice and Bert are engaged in a
metalinguistic negotiation of some sort over which norms to accept for the purposes of their
conversation. In addition, however, Silk notes that the disagreement between Bert and Alice is
quasi-expressivist, concerning "what moral attitudes to take up regarding Sally's giving to the
poor" (224).
Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe (2016) offer a similar account to Silk's. Their theory is
based on Robert Stalnaker's concept of 'common ground' (or 'context set'), i.e. the set of
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propositions assumed by the participants of the context to be true (Stalnaker 2014 25). According
to Stalnaker, assertions in contexts of conversation are proposals to update the common ground
(51). When one's proposal is accepted and the common ground is updated, possible worlds that
are incompatible with the update are removed from the context set. The possible worlds that are
removed are worlds that both parties reject.
Like Silk, then, Khoo & Knobe (2016) think that normative contexts contain a discourselevel variable of some kind that is saturated with a value by the participants to the conversation.
When a speaker makes a normative assertion, she proposes a value (e.g., N) for that variable. Her
interlocutor can either accept or reject N as appropriate for the context. If she accepts the
proposal that N should be the value of the discourse-level variable, then all of the possible worlds
in the common ground that are incompatible with N are banished and conversation proceeds with
the assumption that subsequent normative utterances will be consistent with N. Khoo & Knobe
differ from Silk in their construal of the truth-conditions of normative utterances. They posit that
the truth-conditions of a speaker's utterance depends on the subsequent moves of her
interlocutors. According to Khoo & Knobe, for example, when Jessica utters (1) about abortion,
she proposes that DCT be accepted as the salient norms of the context. Furthermore, at the time
of her utterance, the truth-value of her utterance that (1) is indeterminate: it is neither true or
false. It depends on Sarah's reaction. If Sarah accepts (1) by uttering 'Yes, I agree', then the
salient norms of the context will be DCT, and her utterance is true just in case abortion is
forbidden by DCT. If Sarah rejects (1), on the other hand, and implicitly proposes some other set
of norms as salient for the context, then both Jessica and Sarah's utterances will be indeterminate.
They are neither true nor false. Their utterances don't express complete truth-conditions or have a
determinate truth-value. In order for their utterances to determine a complete set of truth-
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conditions, a set of norms must be established. In failing to establish a set of norms, their
utterances lack a truth value.
Khoo & Knobe's theory can be classified as a version of 'speaker's group relativism' that
was originally developed by Gilbert Harman (1975). According to speaker's group relativism, the
normative theory that is shared by the speaker and her audience fixes the truth-conditions and
truth-value of her utterance. Max Kölbel (2004) articulates speaker's group relativism as the
claim that ". . . any sentence of the form 'A ought to do x' is propositionally equivalent to the
corresponding sentence of the form 'The moral code shared by you (the audience), me (the
speaker) and A requires A to do x'" (301). For Khoo & Knobe, if one's interlocutor doesn't think
that the proposed norms are appropriate for the context, then one's utterance is semantically
incomplete and doesn't have a truth-value.
In contrast to speaker's group relativism, James Dreier's (1990) advocates a form of
'speaker relativism'. According to Dreier, normative expressions are genuine indexicals (like
those in Cappelen & Lepore's basic set) (8-9). Moreover, the content, or proposition expressed
by a normative utterance, for Dreier, " . . . is a function of the affective attitudes of the speaker in
the context. Thus, 'x is good' means 'x is highly evaluated by standards of system M,' where M is
filled in by looking at the affective or motivational states of the speaker and constructing from
them a practical system" (9).13 On Dreier's view, then, the speaker's normative theory, not the
normative theory of her audience or the culture of which she is a part ('the speaker's group')
determines the truth-conditions of her utterance (1990 22).

13

Dreier's characterization of a moral system here is illuminating, for one might plausibly
suppose that lots of people don't actually endorse a particular moral system. Dreier offers a way in which
a metaethical contextualist might account for such cases. One might not have a definite set of norms in
mind, but one's utterance will, nevertheless, be entailed by or follow from some (perhaps very small) set
of propositions that combine to form a norm or moral system.
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Despite the various differences between these theorists, they all posit that normative
utterances take weak interpretations. They are, therefore, vulnerable to the problem of
disagreement. Silk's explanation of normative disagreement emphasizes a negotiation over the
norms that are appropriate for the context. In accepting or rejecting one's interlocutor's proposal,
one also expresses one's non-cognitive attitude toward those norms. Khoo & Knobe offer a
metalinguistic account that I consider in greater detail below. In both cases, however, they fall
short of satisfactorily explaining disagreement in realist contexts.14

14

While Dreier has written on disagreement, he has not, to my knowledge, offered an account of
how his theory deals with disagreement.
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4

BELIEF-DEPENDENT METAETHICAL CONTEXTUALISM (BDMC)

One way to begin our discussion of BDMC is to see how belief-dependence works in Kratzer's
treatment of epistemic modals. Consider (16), for example, where Roger is rumored to be elected
chief.
16. Roger was reportedly elected to be chief.
Kratzer notes that (16) might be interpreted in one of two ways. Depending on the speaker's
beliefs about the rumor, (16) might take a weak or strong interpretation, expressing (17) or (18)
respectively:
17. Given the rumor, Roger must have been elected chief.
18. According to the rumor, Roger was reportedly elected chief.
According to Kratzer, because the speaker of (17) is committed to the truth of the rumor, (17) is
false if the rumor is false and Roger is not elected chief. Unlike the speaker of (17), however, the
speaker of (18) is not committed to the veracity of the rumor, so (18) is true as long as Roger was
in fact rumored to be elected chief. In order for (18) to be false, the speaker would have to have
misunderstood the rumor.
What this amounts to, then, is that one's belief about the rumor that Roger was elected
chief influences the truth-conditions of one's utterance that (16). Kratzer's treats (16) in a beliefdependent manner. It will have different interpretations, and different truth-conditions,
depending on the beliefs of the speaker. While Kratzer limits the distinction between weak and
strong interpretations to epistemic modals, and while there are certainly important differences
between epistemic modals and deontic modals, as I will now argue, one of the insights of BDMC
is that something like Kratzer's distinction is also applicable to deontic modals and other moral
expressions as well.
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BDMC is just the view that the truth-conditions of one's utterance of some normative or
moral sentence φ will depend on one's beliefs about the norms assumed by one's utterance that φ.
In positing that the salient norms will be the speaker's, and not the speaker's group, BDMC is a
variant of speaker-relativism. One might take one of two attitudes toward some body of norms.
One might think that they are appropriate for that context but not appropriate for other contexts
where the norms in question are of the same type (e.g., etiquette norms). Alternatively, one might
think that they are appropriate for all contexts of that same type. Josiah's attitude toward etiquette
norms is an example of the first case. We might imagine that Josiah thinks that etiquette norms
are actually quite ridiculous. In some cases, he will gladly accept that non-U.S. etiquette norms
are appropriate, such as when he is in another country where they are not applicable. Jessica's
attitude toward DCT is an example of the second case. Unlike Josiah, she does not think that
DCT is just appropriate for some moral contexts but inappropriate for other moral contexts. DCT
is appropriate for all moral contexts. As long as she believes DCT, there will never be a time
when she accepts some other set of moral norms as appropriate when (non-facetiously) uttering
some moral sentence.
Jessica's moral beliefs are stable and context-independent in a way that is not true of
Josiah's beliefs about etiquette. Her moral beliefs are non-negotiable, which is why accounts of
disagreement that emphasize metalinguistic negotiation fail to satisfy us in realist contexts. It is
easy to imagine Josiah and Jamal negotiating over which norms are appropriate in their context.
Jamal readily acquiesces once he recognizes that the appropriate norms really are those that
prevail in the U.S. It is decidedly difficult to imagine a similar scenario where Jessica readily
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acquiesces to Sarah's assumption that Utilitarian-inspired norms are appropriate for the context.
Jessica is a moral realist. Josiah, on the other hand, is not an etiquette realist. 15
Now, if one is a realist about some normative domain, there are intuitive connections
between one’s belief that φ and one’s utterance that φ, where φ is some moral sentence. In
general, one’s utterance that φ will express one’s belief that φ. In general, moreover, the truthconditions of one's utterance that φ will generally be the same as the truth-conditions of one's
belief that φ. This is not so for non-realists about that normative domain, since they lack fixed
and stable beliefs about the norms in question that extend across all contexts. We might express
these ideas using the following principles:
A. In general, one's normative utterance that φ expresses one's normative belief that φ.
B. The truth-conditions of one's normative utterance that φ with the intent to express one's
belief that φ are the same as the truth-conditions of one's normative belief that φ.
If (A) and (B) are true, then we might gain insight into the truth-conditions of one's utterance that
φ by considering the truth-conditions of one's normative belief that φ, which is intuitively
expressed by one's utterance that φ. Clarity around the truth-conditions of one's normative belief
that φ might also offer insight into the nature of the disagreements in which one might find
oneself when one utters φ in order to express one's belief that φ. More specifically, attending to
the truth-conditions of Jessica's belief that (1) might plausibly shed light on the truth-conditions
of her utterance that (1) when she is engaged in a disagreement with Sarah, which might then
enable insight into the nature of their disagreement.
Consider, then, what must be true in the world in order for Jessica's belief that (1) to be
true. She's a moral realist who believes that God exists and determines the moral facts. If you
15

While etiquette realism is a conceptual possibility, few people, I think, would consider
themselves etiquette realists.
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were to ask Jessica what conditions must obtain in order for her belief that 'abortion is always
wrong' to be true, what do you suppose she'd say? To be sure, I am speculating here, but my
hunch is that, after struggling a bit, Jessica would ultimately have to say something to the effect
that her belief that (1) is true on the condition that God forbids abortion, or something along
those lines. It's not clear what else she might say. One possibility, of course, is that she might say
that it's true just in case abortion really is wrong, but, as we've seen, that's not very illuminating,
and I don't think she'd say that. She ought, I think, to be able to describe the truth-conditions of
her belief without just restating the sentence. Any replies to the effect that 'abortion is wrong just
in case it's really wrong' are not illuminating, precisely because 'wrong' is context-sensitive.
What Jessica means by 'wrong' is precisely the question being asked of her. At this point, then, it
seems to me that she'd have to say something to the effect that her belief is true just in case God
forbids abortion. If this is right, though, and if (A) and (B) are true, then her utterance that (1) is
false if God doesn't exist, or if DCT is false. We can say with some degree of certainty, I think,
that she would reject a weak interpretation of her belief that (1). She would not regard her belief
that 'φ is always wrong' as true as long as DCT forbids abortion and even if some other theory is
correct. She doesn't think that other moral norms are on a par with DCT, and that other people's
moral beliefs are just as true as hers. She thinks that DCT is the correct moral theory.
What about Sarah? For simplicity, assume that Sarah is an atheist in addition to a
Utilitarian. What must the world be like in order for her belief that 'abortion is sometimes
morally permitted' to be true? It is, admittedly, less clear what exactly must be true for Sarah's
belief to be true (again, a point in favor of metaethical contextualism). But it does seem to me
that her belief would be false in worlds in which God exists and determines the moral facts. In
my view, we should regard her belief that 'abortion is sometimes morally permissible' as false if
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it were to turn out that God exists, that God determines the moral facts, and that God forbids
abortion in every single case.
The upshot of BDMC, then, is that the truth-conditions of the utterances of realists about
some domain will be different than the truth-conditions of the utterances of non-realists about
that or some other domain. Jessica's belief that (1) determines a set of possible worlds in which
God exists, DCT is true, and DCT forbids abortion. Sarah's rejection of (1) determines a set of
possible worlds in which Utilitarianism is true and sometimes permits it. Their utterances take
strong interpretations. When they disagree, at least one of them is wrong. But these observations
are not true of Josiah and Jamal. Josiah and Jamal aren't realists about etiquette. They think that
some norms are appropriate in some cases and that others are appropriate in others. While they
might have in mind a set of etiquette norms in their dispute about Sophia's fork usage, we needn't
suppose that they believe that those norms are objectively true and appropriate for all contexts.
Their utterances take weak interpretations, and their utterances might both be true. Unlike the
disagreement between Jessica and Sarah, which cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of a
negotiation over the right set of norms for the context, the disagreement between Josiah and
Jamal is satisfactorily explained in terms of a metalinguistic negotiation of some kind.
Before moving on to see how this account fares in different contexts of disagreement, it is
worth considering a contextualist-inspired modification to Kratzer's account of deontic modals.
Recall from above that Kratzer says that (3) expresses a proposition like (15).
3. Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
15. Given the moral laws, Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
Now, which moral laws are Jessica and Sarah talking about here? Do they refer to the same
moral laws, or might they have different moral laws in mind? The source of moral law is, in my
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view, the matter about which Jessica and Sarah disagree. Given that Jessica is a Divine
Command Theorist and Sarah is a Utilitarian, it seems (and we have been supposing) that their
utterances refer to different (alleged) moral laws. If we (falsely) assume that they are referring to
the same moral laws, then their disagreement is merely exegetical in nature. That is, they agree
on the referent of the expression 'the moral laws' but disagree about what those laws say. On this
construal, their disagreement is like the disagreement between two Divine Command Theorists
who agree that the Bible is the source of moral law but disagree over whether the Bible forbids
abortion.
While this is plausible with respect to disagreements between two people who accept the
same moral laws, as with Jessica and Sarah, this is often not the case. Part of the disagreement
between Jessica and Sarah concerns the referent of the expression 'the moral laws'. Does 'the
moral laws' refer to the content of DCT or Utilitarianism? Their disagreement concerns whether
DCT or Utilitarianism is the source of the moral laws.
In light of this, we might modify Kratzer's construal along contextualist lines so that
deontic modals are context-sensitive. Accordingly, when Jessica utters (3), she expresses a
proposition like (19) rather than (15).
3. Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
15. Given the moral laws, Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
19. Given DCT, Felicia mustn't have an abortion.
Similarly, when Sarah utters (20), she would express a proposition like (21).
20. No, Felicia may have an abortion.
21. Given Utilitarianism, Felicia may have an abortion.
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Now, the final step is to reintroduce Kratzer's distinction between weak and strong
interpretations. Do (3) and (20) take weak or strong interpretations? Are Jessica and Sarah
committed to the truth of the norms to which their utterances are sensitive such that the truth of
these norms is among the truth-conditions of their utterances? According to belief-independent
construals, the truth of the norms in question does not figure in the truth-conditions of their
respective utterances. According to BDMC, however, (3) and (20) take strong interpretations. (3)
determines a set of possible worlds in which DCT is true and DCT forbids abortion. Similarly,
(20) determines a set of possible worlds in which Utilitarianism is true and Utilitarianism permits
abortion in cases like Felicia's.
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5

THE PROBLEM OF DISAGREEMENT

I suggested above that the problem of disagreement emerges for belief-independent accounts of
metaethical contextualism like Silk's and Khoo & Knobe's. There are, I think, two primary
problems. First, there is the familiar problem of explaining the disagreement between two
disputants whose utterances don't express exclusionary truth-conditional content. If beliefindependent metaethical contextualists (excluding Khoo & Knobe) are right about Jessica and
Sarah, for example, then their utterances might both be true. So how can we explain their
apparent disagreement? Metalinguistic and quasi-expressivist accounts seem plausible in some
contexts (like the non-realist context in which Josiah and Jamal find themselves) but less
plausible in others (like the realist context in which Jessica and Sarah find themselves). A
second, related problem concerns the fact that belief-independent contextualist views treat all
cases of normative disagreement the same way, whether the disagreement concerns what
someone ought to wear to a party or whether preemptive nuclear strikes are morally permissible.
In both cases, the disagreement is said to concern one's non-cognitive attitudes toward the issue
at hand or a negotiation over which norms are appropriate for a context.
It seems that we should be able to do better than this. Ideally, a theory of normative
language ought to predict exclusionary truth-conditional content in some contexts (nuclear
strikes) but not others (attire). In some contexts, but not others, somebody is wrong. As a
consequence, a theory of normative language ought to enable different explanations of the
disagreement between realists about some normative domain and non-realists about that or some
other normative domain. BDMC does just that.
To see how, it is helpful to consider four paradigm types of disagreement—(i) exegetical
realist, (ii) exegetical non-realist, (iii) non-exegetical non-realist, and (iv) non-exegetical realist.
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Exegetical realist normative disagreement obtains between two moral realists who agree on the
norm, standard, or principle that is salient in the context. Moreover, as realists, they believe that
this norm or standard demarcates right from wrong and determines what one ought to do across
all contexts. Despite agreeing on the salient norm or standard, however, they disagree on its
interpretation. We might imagine two Divine Command Theorists, one of whom (Bill) thinks
that DCT permits some abortions, and the other of whom (Veronica) thinks that DCT forbids all
abortions. Both Bill and Veronica accept that DCT is true and that it alone determines what one
ought morally to do. Their disagreement is exegetical since it concerns the correct interpretation
of DCT. Their disagreement might (or might not) be resolved by an evening spent discussing
passages from the Bible.
Like exegetical realist disagreement, exegetical non-realist disagreement occurs when the
disputants agree on the norm or standard that is salient in the conversational context but disagree
about the interpretation. Unlike exegetical realist disagreement, however, the disputants to an
exegetical non-realist disagreement aren't committed to the belief that the salient norms are
objectively true and appropriate for all contexts where norms of that type (e.g., greeting norms)
are salient. Flushing out the vignette above wherein Josiah and Jamal disagree about which fork
Sophia should use when eating her salad, imagine that Sophia is about to be married and that she
is meeting her in-laws for the first time at a dinner party at her in-law’s house. Accompanying
her will be her parents, Josiah and Marie, and Josiah's friend Jamal. Josiah, Marie, Jamal, and
Sophia are travelling together in a car to the dinner party. Josiah and Marie each accept that the
norms of etiquette that prevail in the U.S. are salient, but they disagree over the content of those
norms. Josia utters (22) and Marie utters (23).
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22. Sophia, sweetie, you should use your rightmost fork when eating your salad.
23. No, Sophia, you shouldn't use your rightmost fork when eating your salad.
Like Bill and Veronica, Josiah and Marie agree that the etiquette norms that prevail in the U.S.
are salient but they disagree about what those norms require. Unlike Bill and Veronica, Josiah
and Marie are not realists about normative domain in question. They don't think that there is an
objective fact of the matter about which etiquette norms are correct. Their utterances express the
following propositions:
24. In view of the norms that prevail in the U.S., Sophia should use her rightmost fork when
eating her salad.
25. In view of the norms that prevail in the U.S., Sophia shouldn't use her rightmost fork
when eating her salad.
The disagreement between Josiah and Marie is exegetical non-realist. Josiah and Marie agree on
the salient norms. One of them is just mistaken about the contents of those norms. Their
disagreement might be resolved by quick consultation of Emily Post's Etiquette: Manners for a
New World.
The third type of normative disagreement is non-exegetical non-realist. Rather than
imagining a dispute between Josiah and Marie, imagine once again the dispute between Josiah
and Jamal, who, recall, hails from Vista, where it is customary to use one's leftmost fork when
eating one's salad. What is more, Jamal mistakenly assumes that all cultures are the same as
Vista in this regard. As before, Josiah utters (22).
22. Sophia, sweetie, you should use your rightmost fork when eating your salad.
Puzzled by Josiah's utterance of (22), Jamal quickly replies with (23):
23. No, Sophia, you shouldn't use your rightmost fork when eating your salad.
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Assume a contextualist analysis of (22) and (23). When Josiah utters (22), he has in mind a set of
norms (the norms that prevail in the U.S.) that he thinks is salient. Likewise, when Jamal rejects
(22), uttering (23), he thinks that the norms that prevail in Vista, which he just assumes are
universal, are salient. Adopting Kratzer's construal of (22) and (23), (22) once again expresses a
proposition like (24) and (23) expresses a proposition like (26).
24. In view of the norms that prevail in the U.S., Sophia should use her rightmost fork when
eating her salad.
26. In view of the norms that prevail in Vista, Sophia shouldn't use her rightmost fork when
eating her salad.
In this case, it seems most plausible to say that Josiah's utterance that (22) is true just in case
people who behave in accordance with the norms that prevail in the U.S. use their rightmost
forks when eating their salads. Likewise, Jamal's utterance that (23) is true just in case people
who behave in accordance with Vistan norms do not use their rightmost forks when eating their
salads.
What should we make of their disagreement? Is it metalinguistic? Quasi-expressivist?
Both, or perhaps something else? It seems to me that their dispute is metalinguistic in nature.
Josiah thinks that the norms that prevail in the U.S., according to which people use their
rightmost fork when eating their salads, are salient. Jamal, unaware that people do things
differently in the U.S., thinks that the norms according to which people use their leftmost fork
are salient. Worrying that Sophia might make a fool of herself, he is quick to correct Josiah. But
once it is made clear to him that it is customary in the U.S. to use the rightmost fork when eating
salads, he will quickly agree with Josiah, reassuring Sophia that she should use her rightmost
fork. The disagreement here is metalinguistic, concerning which norms are salient for the
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purposes of the context and, it seems, nothing else. Note, moreover, that, in this case, we needn't
suppose that either party is wrong. Josiah and Jamal both speak truthfully when they utter (22)
and (23) respectively, and their disagreement doesn't result in exclusionary truth-conditional
content. Like utterances in contexts where exegetical non-realist disagreement obtains, utterances
in contexts where non-exegetical non-realist disagreement obtains take weak interpretations.
belief-independent accounts of metaethical contextualism adequately handle the disagreement
that obtains in cases like these.
These first three types of disagreement all contrast with the disagreement between Jessica
and Sarah. Their utterances take strong interpretations and their disagreement is an example of
non-exegetical realist normative disagreement. Their disagreement is not exegetical since they do
not accept the same norm or standard. However, their disagreement isn't just metalinguistic
either since, given BDMC, Jessica and Sarah express exclusionary truth-conditional content.
Their utterances express their beliefs and their beliefs are truth-conditionally incompatible.
Jessica’s belief that (1) is true just in case God exists, DCT is true, and DCT always forbids
abortion, whereas Sarah’s belief is true just in case Utilitarianism is true and sometimes permits
abortion. Since their utterances express their beliefs, and their beliefs are incompatible,
somebody is wrong.
If the above considerations are apt, then it follows that the assumption that normative
utterances always take weak interpretations is false. This assumption fails to consider differences
in the truth-conditions of normative utterances that stem from differences in the beliefs that
speakers have about the norms in question. In realist contexts, it fails to do justice to the
normative realist's metaphysical commitments. While standard contextualist construals are
successful in non-realist contexts, a belief-dependent contextualist theory is required in order to
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account for the moral realist's belief that their moral theory is true and determines the moral
facts.
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6

OBJECTIONS TO BDMC

Recall from above that I posited principles (A) and (B) in order to try to get a sense of the truthconditions of the moral beliefs of moral realists like Jessica and Sarah with the hypothesis that it
might allow a more satisfying explanation of their disagreement than metalinguistic negotiation
and quasi-expressivism.
A. In general, one's normative utterance that φ expresses one's normative belief that φ.
B. The truth-conditions of one's normative utterance that φ with the intent to express one's
belief that φ are the same as the truth-conditions of one's normative belief that φ.
I think that the most forceful objections to my account focus on doubts about (B). One might be
inclined to reject (B) primarily due to a concern that the acceptance of (B) leads to some variety
of semantic holism (explained below). Setting aside one's reasons for rejecting (B) for a moment,
it is illuminating to consider a contextualist account of normative language that does reject (B).
Khoo & Knobe offer a contextualist response to the problem of disagreement that rejects
(B). In their experiments, they set out to see whether people think that normative disagreement
always requires that somebody is wrong, i.e., whether two people might disagree without
exclusionary truth-conditional content. If people accept that two people can disagree on some
normative matter and yet neither party is wrong, then this would provide some evidence in favor
of a contextualist account of normative language and disagreement. In their study, they found
that participants did accept this possibility, especially if the disputants were from two very
different cultures (Khoo & Knobe 2). Khoo & Knobe offer an explanation of these results that
rejects (B).16 As we've seen, their explanation is based on Stalnaker's idea of common ground.

16

Khoo & Knobe offer this theory as one of several ways in which one might explain their data
(22). They are aware of various possible objections to their proposal (29). Still, their proposal is useful,
since it rejects (B).
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Khoo & Knobe argue that normative disagreement obtains without exclusionary content
(people disagree and neither party is wrong) whenever the disputants' proposals to update the
common ground would result in an empty context set (15). Disagreement without exclusion
occurs, that is, when the disputants accept different norms. They conclude that ". . . the picture is
that people disagree whenever there is a conflict between the proposals they are making. Thus, if
two speakers can make conflicting proposals even while making non-exclusionary claims, we
would have a case of disagreement without exclusion" (15). Disagreement without exclusion is
possible, on their view, when one speaker utters some normative sentence, proposing a set of
norms that are appropriate for the context, but then a second speaker rejects those norms by
uttering some contradictory sentence. When this occurs, the truth-values of their respective
utterances are indeterminate—they are neither true nor false—since the speakers have not agreed
upon a norm that is salient for the context (23-4). Since neither of their utterances are false, it's
not the case that at least one party is wrong (29).
To recap their view as it relates to Jessica and Sarah, when Jessica utters that (1), she
proposes that DCT be accepted as the salient norm of the context. Furthermore, at the time of her
utterance that (1), the truth-value is indeterminate. In rejecting (1), Sarah rejects Jessica's
proposal that DCT should be the salient normative theory of the context and proposes that
Utilitarianism be the salient norm. Since each of their proposals are blocked, the truth-values of
their respective utterances are indeterminate. Thus, they disagree, and neither party is wrong.
Khoo & Knobe articulate a form of metaethical contextualism, then, according to which ". . .
moral sentences are only true or false relative to a parameter that is fixed by the context in which
they are uttered" and they attempt to explain cases of disagreement without exclusionary content
by suggesting that this occurs whenever this parameter is indeterminate (22).
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While there is much to like about Khoo & Knobe's account, it strikes me as untenable
precisely because it rejects (B)—according to which the truth-conditions of one's sincere
normative utterance that φ intended to express one's belief that φ are the same as the truthconditions of one's belief that φ. Imagine, for example, that Jessica believes some proposition,
such as (1), at t1 when she is alone in her living room considering the moral permissibility of
abortion. Insofar as (1) is truth-apt, Jessica's belief that (1) at t1 has truth-conditions and a truthvalue. Imagine, now, that Jessica attends a party in the evening where she encounters Sarah,
who, as it happens, has also spent the afternoon considering the moral permissibility of abortion
and comes to believe that it is sometimes permissible. At t2, now, while on the porch enjoying
the evening air, Jessica and Sarah begin discussing abortion, at which point Jessica utters (1)—
'abortion is always wrong'—and Sarah denies (1), uttering 'abortion is not always wrong'.
Assume that they each intend to express their beliefs about abortion. If (B) is true, then the truthconditions and truth-value of Jessica's utterance of (1) at t2 are the same as the truth-conditions
and truth-value of her belief that (1) at t1. The same observations are true of Sarah. As we have
seen, when coupled with BDMC, the acceptance of (A) and (B) has the consequence that Jessica
and Sarah express exclusionary truth-conditional content triggered by their belief in incompatible
norms. On Khoo & Knobe's construal, however, Jessica's utterance that (1) at t2 has different
truth-conditions and a different truth-value (indeterminate) than her belief that (1) at t1.
While this construal explains their data, it strikes me as implausible. Imagine, for
example, that Jessica's belief is true. Imagine that God does exist and that DCT is true and that
abortion is wrong according to DCT. Her belief that (1) would be true at t1. Moreover, were she
to utter (1) aloud in her living room alone at t1, she would have presumably uttered a true
statement. On Khoo & Knobe's construal, however, while Jessica's utterance of (1) at t1 is indeed
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true, her utterance of (1) at t2 is indeterminate, since the truth-value of her utterance is dependent
upon whether she and Sarah are able to agree upon a salient set of norms to govern their context.
In failing to do so, the truth-values of their utterances are both indeterminate, and, therefore,
neither true nor false. I find these consequences difficult to accept.
Consider, second, that it is plausible to suppose that disputants might disagree in their
beliefs or judgements without even speaking. For example, Jessica and Sarah disagree in their
judgements about whether abortion is wrong.17 We ought, therefore, to be able to explain their
disagreement without requiring that they gather together in the same room to express their beliefs
through speech. If their judgments have determinate truth-conditions and truth-values, and we
can explain their disagreement merely by attending to the incompatible truth-conditions of their
judgments, why suppose that their respective utterances are indeterminate and that the source of
their disagreement is something besides incompatible truth-conditional content?
Given that the rejection of (B) can lead to some bizarre consequences, why reject it?
One reason that one might reject (B) is because it seems intuitive that one can sometimes
truthfully utter some sentence S even if one doesn’t believe S and even if one’s belief that S is
false. Consider (27), for example.
27. There’s a cat on that mat.
A child speaks truthfully when she points to a nearby cat and utters (27) even though she can’t
yet distinguish cats from small dogs. We’re inclined to say that her utterance is true even though

17

Finlay echoes this point when he remarks that ". . . people can apparently be in fundamental
normative or moral disagreement in judgment, without speaking at all" (195). Finlay contrasts state
disagreement with activity disagreement. State disagreement is characterized by difference of attitude or
judgment about some action whereas activity disagreement occurs in a context wherein a verbal dispute
has obtained (195). According to Finlay, ". . . the traditional metaethical Problem of Lost Disagreement . .
. extends to interconversational and judgment disagreement, and so is more plausibly interpreted as a
judgment about state disagreements" (195-6).
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she doesn’t meet the necessary criteria for believing that (27). She might not have any beliefs
about cats and she might have a bunch of false beliefs about cats but still truthfully utter (27).
Indeed, we might say that a parrot speaks truthfully when she repeats a caretaker’s utterance
even though we’d be disinclined to say that the parrot believes the content of that utterance.
There are many circumstances, then, in which the truth-conditions of some sentence S are
completely isolated from the truth-conditions of one’s belief that S. In general, moreover, this is
a good thing given the plausibility of ‘belief holism’ and the undesirability of ‘semantic holism’.
Belief holism is the view that many beliefs are rationally related to one another such that it is
impossible to have one without the other (Pagin 215). To use an example inspired by Jane Heal
(1994), it would seem that in order to believe that (27), one must also believe (28) and (29).
27. There’s a cat on that mat.
28. There is an animal on that mat.
29. There is a biological organism on that mat.
If one claims to believe that (27) but not (28) or (29), then their belief that (27) doesn't have the
same meaning, content, or truth-conditions as mine. Yet it seems that we both say the same thing
and that we both speak truthfully when we utter (27).
There are, then, good reasons for supposing that the truth-conditions of sentences and
utterances are isolated and independent from the truth-conditions of beliefs about those
sentences. There are good reasons, that is, for supposing that belief holism is true but that
semantic holism is false. Semantic holism is essentially the view that the meanings of
expressions are interconnected in much the same way that the meanings of beliefs are
interconnected.18 Moreover, the truth-conditions of sentences are derived in large part from the
Semantic holism is notoriously difficult to define. Moreover, definitions are fraught with
controversy. The most influential (and most controversial) definition is given by Fodor & Lepore (1992),
18
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truth-conditions of one’s beliefs, so that the truth-conditions of one’s belief that φ will be the
same as the truth-conditions of one’s utterance that φ.
But semantic holism leads to a number of undesirable consequences because people have
different belief systems. If the meanings of my utterances are determined by my belief system
and the meanings of your utterances are determined by your belief system, then it is difficult to
see how we can successfully communicate. It seems to follow that English speakers don't really
speak the same language unless they have the same beliefs, that one can't learn a language
without already knowing the language, and that one can't actually ever change one's mind about
some proposition, since, in doing so, that proposition has different meaning. As Jerry Fodor &
Ernest Lepore (1992) observe, semantic holism would seem to jeopardize the attractive picture
that ". . . linguistic and theoretical commitments of speaker and hearer can overlap partially to
any degree you like: you can believe some of what I believe without believing all of it; you can
understand part of my language without having learned the rest of it, and so forth" (10).
Now, since semantic holism is undesirable and the plausibility of BDMC rests on (B),
which seems to lead to semantic holism, it would seem that BDMC is in some trouble unless one
is willing to bite the bullet on semantic holism. If the truth-conditions of a speaker’s belief that φ
are allowed to influence the truth-conditions of her utterance that φ, then we might be headed
toward an untenable form of semantic holism. How might we defend against this charge?
We defend against it by noting the differences between normative expressions and
expressions that are straightforwardly empirical in nature, such as natural kind terms. Erich
Rast's (2017) recent research is helpful here. He develops what he calls a 'dual aspect' theory of

who define semantic holism as the view that "[o]nly whole languages or whole theories or whole belief
systems really have meanings, so that the meanings of smaller units—words, sentences, hypotheses,
predictions, discourses, dialogues, texts, thoughts, and the like—are merely derivative" (x).
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normative language. He distinguishes between what he calls the 'core meaning' and the
'noumenal meaning' of an expression. The core meaning of an expression is that "smallest
common denominator" that competent speakers of a language must agree upon in order to
successfully communicate with one another (412). Core meaning is "incomplete and loose," and
"evolves primarily out of a need to communicate and coordinate behavior" (412). We might
think, for example, that the core meaning of a moral predicate like 'wrong' evolves out of
paradigm cases that virtually everyone agrees are wrong (or that everyone's norms forbid). From
these paradigm cases, competent speakers of a language understand the core meaning of moral
expressions. Indeed, speakers of a language must agree upon a core meaning of an expression in
order to successfully use that expression and to enable communication.
The noumenal meaning of an expression, on the other hand, is an expansion of the core
meaning that refers to what Rast calls the 'noumenon', which is some aspect of reality (412). The
noumenal meaning is "a refined meaning with which informed speakers come up when they are
intending to narrow down and state more precisely a purported aspect of reality that is suggested
by a . . . core meaning and sometimes, though not always, also perceived or measured from
observing nature" (417). About noumenal meaning, Rast says:
Noumenal meaning generally evolves out of core meaning when people start asking
questions that aim at reality. For example, two speakers can talk about a lightning during
a thunderstorm and agree that it needs to be avoided and that it is likely that fire can be
found where the lightning has struck [i.e., core meaning]. But they may also start asking
themselves what . . . lightning really is. Is it a sign from the gods, some special form of
fire, an electromagnetic phenomenon? These questions concern the noumenal meaning
(412).
In developing his view, Rast draws on Hilary Putnam's work on semantic externalism.
According to Putnam, the meaning of certain expressions depends on natural facts that
competent language users needn't understand. One can successfully use the expression 'water'

42

without knowing that water refers to H2O. Using Rast's language, the core meaning of 'water' is
something like 'the clear, life-sustaining, drinkable liquid that fills rivers' whereas the noumenal
meaning is something like 'H2O'. For many expressions, especially natural kind terms like
'water', 'gold', etc., the noumenal meaning is determined by experts. A competent language user
might know the core meaning of 'lightning', for example, and use the term to make true
statements, without knowing the noumenal meaning, which is determined by experts. So, even if
someone believed that the noumenal meaning of water on earth is XYZ, they still truthfully utter,
when pointing to a river and mistakenly thinking that the river is full of XYZ, 'that's a lot of
water!'. Their belief that ‘that’s a lot of water’ might be false but their utterance is true.
But this linguistic 'division of labor', where experts determine the noumenal meaning of
an expression, is only possible when there are actual experts. This is completely plausible for
expressions whose referents can be observed and measured, such as when they refer to empirical
reality. However, these criteria do not hold for normative terms. In cases like these, where there
is no settled noumenal meaning of an expression, people develop competing accounts of the
noumenal meaning that are "principally contestable and often [hinge] on complicated
background theories which might turn out to be false" (413).
So, while semantic externalism is plausible for expressions that describe empirical
reality, where experts are able to determine their correct extension, it is not plausible for
normative expressions, since there aren’t any experts, or the experts disagree. On Rast's view,
moral realists who endorse some body of norms are best regarded as theorists about what it
means for an action to be really wrong in the same way that scientists were at one time mere
theorists about what water or gold or lightning really is. Moreover, moral realists each posit
competing moral theories, or noumenal meanings of moral expressions, that they think are

43

correct. One might say, then, that experts, constrained by empirical facts, contribute to the
determination of the truth-conditions of utterances about natural kinds. But, if there are no moral
experts, or if the moral experts fundamentally disagree about which moral theory is correct, then
there is no noumenal meaning of moral expressions. So, the truth-conditions of sentences
containing moral expressions are dependent upon the norms or theories endorsed by speakers in
a way that does not hold for sentences containing natural kind terms.
So, we might accept, then, that a child speaks truthfully when she utters (27) even though
she might have few if any beliefs about cats and those beliefs might be false.
27. There’s a cat on that mat.
But there does not seem to be an analogue in the moral case. Does the child (or a parrot) of a
Divine Command Theorist speak truthfully when she utters ‘abortion is always wrong’ if we
assume that she doesn’t know what abortion is or what Divine Command Theory is? More to the
point, given the ways in which normative expressions differ from natural kind terms and other
straightforward empirical expressions, is it not plausible to suppose that one’s background
beliefs influence the truth-conditions of one’s moral utterances in realist contexts even though
one’s background beliefs about natural kind terms don’t influence the truth-conditions of one’s
empirical utterances? If this is plausible, then we might say that semantic holism is true of the
moral utterances of moral realists but deny that semantic holism is generally true. It seems
plausible to me that Jessica and Sarah can still mean then the same thing and still speak truthfully
when they utter (27) even if we suppose that their moral beliefs affect the truth-conditions of
their moral utterances.
At this point, it is important to bear in mind the concerns that motivate contextualism in
general and BDMC in particular in order to see whether one is willing to simply bite the bullet
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on the form of moral semantic holism that is permitted by BDMC. The original worry is that
moral expressions don't seem to have invariant, stable, conventional meanings. While they do of
course have a core meaning of some kind that constrains their appropriate use, core meaning is
too loose to determine a set of truth-conditions. So, what are the truth-conditions of our moral
utterances that 'φ is wrong?' We can follow the minimalist and say that 'φ is wrong' is true just in
case 'φ is wrong'. But this doesn't really answer our questions. We still might wonder what
'wrong' means. We can follow the belief-independent metaethical contextualist and say that the
utterance 'φ is wrong' expresses the proposition 'φ is wrong according to N' where N is some
principle or theory. This construal gets us closer to a satisfying account of the truth-conditions of
normative utterances, but it doesn't cohere with our intuitions in realist contexts. We don't want
to say that Jessica's utterance that (1) about abortion is true just in case DCT forbids it. That's not
what she believes when she believes that (1) and it's not what she tries to express via her
utterance, or at least so it seems to me.19 We could embrace some variety of moral relativism.
Moral relativism is outside of the scope of this paper, but the moral relativist is motivated by
many of the same concerns as the contextualist. But she also faces many of the problems of the
belief-independent contextualist, namely, that moral realists can never really express their beliefs
that, say, 'abortion is wrong simpliciter' or that 'DCT is the right moral theory simpliciter'. In
light of these concerns, BDMC strikes me as an attractive alternative.

19

Indeed, on belief-independent construals of moral language, there would be no way for Jessica
to express her belief that 'abortion is always wrong'. She can only express her belief that it's wrong
according to DCT. There's no way to distinguish her utterance that abortion is always wrong' from
someone else's utterance that 'abortion is always wrong according to DCT'.

45

7

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have argued for a form of metaethical contextualism that enables additional
traction on the problem of disagreement. Among the motivations for a contextualist theory of
some kind is to bridge the alleged gap between 'what is said' and 'what is meant', i.e., to bridge
the gap between the 'literal' truth-conditions of one's utterance and the intuitive truth-conditions
of one's utterance. When a semantic theory predicts that the literal truth-conditions of one's
utterance that φ stand in stark contrast to what conversational participants would reasonably
regard as the truth-conditions of one's utterance that φ, then a contextualist theory can bridge this
gap. So, it is disappointing that belief-independent accounts of metaethical contextualism have
failed to bridge that gap.
In failing to successfully account for the intuitive truth-conditions of normative and moral
utterances, moreover, belief-independent accounts of metaethical contextualism have also left
themselves vulnerable to several related problems, the most pressing of which is the problem of
lost disagreement. In this paper, I've sketched the outlines of a novel belief-dependent account of
metaethical contextualism that I think more successfully bridges the gap between the actual
truth-conditions of normative utterances and the intuitive truth-conditions of those utterances.
The strength of this view is its flexibility. Most people who use moral language are moral realists
who think that the moral norms that they endorse are universally true and applicable to all
contexts. A theory of moral language ought to give such people a chance to express their beliefs
in a straightforward manner. The account that I argued for above allows them to do just that. At
the same time, we're not realists about all normative matters, and some of us are not realists
about any normative matters. A theory of normative language ought to cohere with the intuitive
truth-conditions of the anti-realist's normative utterances just as well as it coheres with the truth-
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conditions of the realist's normative utterances. Finally, a theory of normative language ought to
predict exclusionary truth-conditional content in at least some contexts of moral disagreement.
Sometimes, surely, somebody is wrong. I've argued that BDMC can accommodate all of these
desiderata.
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